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Abstract 
Cooper’s gatekeeper state theory provides a powerful way to read recent 
Zimbabwean politics, but the country also challenges his assumptions 
about both the elite-led nature of gatekeeping, and deterministic 
assumptions about its direct emergence from colonialism. Drawing on 
ordinary Zimbabweans’ perspectives I make two arguments. First, I show 
how consolidation of Zimbabwe’s ‘gate' has been shaped by events and 
contingent reactions to them since 1980, complicating Cooper’s focus on 
the immanence of colonial structures. Second, I show how consolidation 
has been achieved through popular ideas of and engagement with the 
outside world. This has been done in reaction to the increasing solidity and 
narrowness of the gate – in the ways Zimbabweans themselves work 
around it – but also in a shift in the ways Zimbabwean people think about 
the legitimacy of gatekeeping.  
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Introduction  
Cooper’s gatekeeper state, published in 2002, is a compelling way to describe 
how post-colonial African governments have supported themselves by tapping 
resource flows in and out of the country at the border, port or ‘gate’ where they 
are easier to control.2 Mechanisms of the gate include exchange rate controls, 
taxation on exports and imports, and encouraging external investment and aid. 
Cooper explains how gatekeeping is historically rooted in European colonial 
approaches which saw African territories as revenue sources, and used access to 
the gate as a form of control. He shows how its continuation since independence 
has narrowed political and economic pluralism in many African countries, as 
state elites promote sectors that rely on the movement of resources through the 
gate, and then monopolise the gate to generate rents and to resource the 
patrimonial networks that keep them in control.  
 
The power of Cooper’s analysis lies in his creation of a vivid metaphor to explain 
a complex set of political and economic relationships, and in the way he roots a 
general explanation of African politics within the historical context of 
colonialism. It is both simple and rich in historical detail, focusing on African-
European relationships as key to understanding how African states use the 
outside world to survive. 
 
However, his approach can be criticised for a concentration on institutional 
formations and elite perspectives; and for an overly deterministic interpretation 
of the influence of the colonial era. He hints at variety in the degree to which 
gatekeeping activities are tolerated or viewed as legitimate – a variety that helps 
explain when they are not – but does little to assess popular conceptions of 
gatekeeper state mechanisms, or indeed to show how these shape and reinforce 
them. Instead, his historical approach tends towards a generalised 
understanding of how gatekeeping stems from colonial logics and institutions 
 
                                                        
2 Cooper, Africa since 1940. 
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In this article I take up Dorman’s argument that Zimbabwe is an example of a 
gatekeeper state,3 but show that it is one largely because of shifts that have 
occurred since independence, both to institutions and in popular reactions to 
them. I make two substantial arguments. First, I show how consolidation of 
Zimbabwe’s ‘gate' has been shaped by events and reactions to them since 1980, 
and particularly since the late 1990s. These have led to a hardening of the idea of 
a firmly-controlled gate and a narrowing of the institutions of the gate. I 
challenge Cooper’s focus on the immanence of colonial structures. While some of 
the structures and logics that lay the groundwork for the development of the 
gatekeeper state can be traced to the colonial period, most of its consolidation 
has occurred since independence particularly in the crisis years since 2000. 
Moreover, this consolidation has largely been to do with the challenge to, or 
overthrowing of, colonial institutional arrangements and attitudes. 
 
Second, I show how consolidation has been achieved through popular ideas of 
and engagement with the outside world. This is done in reaction to the 
increasing solidity and narrowness of the gate – in the ways Zimbabweans 
themselves work around it – but also in a shift in the ways Zimbabwean people 
think about the role of their state and its international relations.4 The 
consolidation of the gatekeeper state is thus not merely an elite-driven 
phenomenon but achieved in the ways ordinary people have reshaped their 
conceptions of legitimate state behaviour, specifically in how elites use rents 
generated through international relationships to resource domestic clients. I 
argue that citizens’ expectations and norms have increasingly contributed to the 
reproduction of the gatekeeper state. 
 
The discussion raises questions about legitimacy. In Zimbabwe, these concern 
not only how the state uses the gate in order to generate spoils, but what it does 
with them. State legitimacy depends on an ability to mobilise resources gained 
through gatekeeping from wider world.  This could be just as much a historical 
                                                        
3 Dorman, Understanding Zimbabwe 
4 Gallagher, Zimbabwe’s International Relations. 
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co-creation of Africans and Europeans, but it is arguably deeper – both in terms 
of its reach into society, and into Zimbabweans’ sense of identity and place in the 
world – than Cooper’s analysis suggests. 
 
Other scholars have framed African statehood around questions of popular 
legitimacy – notably Ekeh’s ‘primordial public',5 Schatzberg’s father-leader,6 
Bayart’s ‘politics of the belly’,7 and Chabal and Daloz’s ‘instrumentalisation of 
disorder’.8 These show in a variety of ways how elite behaviours are shaped 
within generally held normative expectations, and thus challenge the idea that 
African statehood floats free of popular engagement and legitimation. Cooper's 
focus on elites can appear less rooted in African societies, yet his account of the 
gatekeeper state is a useful corrective to the tendency in these accounts to 
essentialise culture as a determining factor of political behaviour. His careful 
historical analysis explores the ways in which events, in particular colonialism, 
have shaped African statehood. ‘Gatekeeper states are thus not “African” 
institutions, nor are the “European" impositions; they emerged out of a peculiar 
Euro-African history’.9  
 
My analysis here aims to tread a path between these two approaches – to take 
popular expectations and normative framings as an essential part of state 
formation and legitimacy, but to borrow both Cooper’s careful empirically-
rooted approach, and his framing of statehood within wider international 
relationships. In doing this, I argue that Cooper’s theory is a powerful way of 
understanding recent Zimbabwean politics – that gatekeeping has not been 
weakened by modern trends such as globalisation, the activities of the BRICS or 
the advent of new communications technology. In fact Zimbabwe, which I 
suggest is not historically a classic gatekeeper state, has evolved to become one.  
                                                        
5 Ekeh, ‘Colonialism and the two publics’. 
6 Schatzberg, Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa. 
7 Bayart, The State in Africa. 
8 Chabal and Daloz, Africa Works. 
9 Cooper, Africa since 1940, p160. 
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The main part of the article is based on research in Zimbabwe between 2011 and 
2014, spanning the middle of the Government of National Unity (the GNU, 
inaugurated after violent and disputed elections in 2008, and comprising 
principally of Robert Mugabe’s ZANU-PF and Morgan Tsvangirai’s MDC-T) 
through to ZANU-PF’s victory at the 2013 elections. This period was arguably 
one of relative political plurality, and also of uncertainty, ending in a return to 
the dominance of ZANU-PF. Following a period of acute crisis,10 this ‘breathing 
space’ has, I argue, helped cement Zimbabwe as a gatekeeper state. 
 
The research involved  interviews and focus groups with members of residents’ 
associations, trade unions, political parties churches and schools. I interviewed 
those running the organisations, and over time was able to engage with those 
they worked with. My interviewees therefore comprised politically and socially 
active people as well as less politically engaged people from their communities. 
Two groups were based in the capital Harare; one in Chitungwiza, a large 
dormitory city some 30 km south of Harare; three in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe’s 
second city, with connections into the surrounding dormitory towns; and two in 
rural areas (Matabeleland South and Mashonaland Central). These groups were 
selected to reflect as wide a range of opinion as possible, which tend to differ 
across rural/urban and regional divides. 
 
As a British academic, it is easier to interview those critical of the regime than 
those who support it.11 Many NGOs tend to be sympathetic to the opposition 
parties, however two of the groups I worked with were pro-ZANU-PF, and 
                                                        
10 Raftopoulos and Mlambo, Becoming Zimbabwe. 
11 Interviews were substantially shaped by my identity as a white British woman. 
At times this led to tendencies to talk up the benefits of the relationship with 
Britain, and at others led to direct verbal attacks on me as a representative of 
one of the countries that was punishing Zimbabwe through sanctions. I have 
discussed elsewhere the effects of my position in relation to the findings of this 
project. See Gallagher, ‘Interviews as catastrophic encounters’. 
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helped me to interview people more sympathetic to the ruling party. Most urban 
residents tended to support opposition parties, while many rural residents I 
spoke to, particularly in Mashonaland Central, expressed strong pro-ZANU-PF 
views. One finding that helped shape my analysis was the way formerly sharp 
differences seemed to dissolve over the GNU period. While the majority of voters 
in Ndebele-dominated Matabeleland and those in urban areas have tended to be 
most critical of ZANU-PF, this became much less the case in 2013. Rural voters, 
who have tended to be more supportive of the government, were less likely to 
have changed their position. 
 
I interviewed more than 200 people over five visits  and interviews were open-
ended. I asked people to tell me about their lives, the history of Zimbabwe and its 
relationships with other parts of the world. Some interviews were one-to-one, 
and others in groups of up to 16. I have not used people’s names or identified the 
groups involved. 
 
 
The early roots of a peculiar gatekeeper state 
 
Cooper addresses Zimbabwe specifically in his discussion of the gatekeeper 
state, but skates over its rather unusual colonial legacies and its transition to a 
‘crony capitalism’.12 Moreover, his analysis, published in 2002, does not 
encompass the dramatic changes that have further transformed the country 
since the land invasions began in 2000. Part of my job in this section is to argue 
                                                        
12 At independence in 1980, Cooper argues, the country had more economic 
options than most, ‘a balance of agricultural, mineral, and industrial possibilities’ 
(2002: 138). However this was dissipated in a few years: ‘Zimbabwe’s elite has 
been Africanized by the kind of crony capitalism typical of gatekeeper states: the 
state does little to encourage an autonomous, African business class, but uses its 
own strategic location to provide opportunities to clients. The poor remain poor, 
and much of Zimbabwe’s population remains in the badly eroded, badly supplied 
rural areas.’ (Ibid) 
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that Zimbabwe did not begin life as a gatekeeper state, and to show how it began 
to evolve into one as economic and political crisis took hold from the 2000s. 
 
Zimbabwe does not conform to Cooper’s model, largely because of the way its 
white population has shaped its history.13 Unlike many British colonies in Africa, 
Rhodesia was substantially affected by the white people who arrived from South 
Africa and England and settled down to farm.14 For the black majority 
population, Britain was not far away – physically or in the imagination – but 
embodied by the white farmer who changed the landscape, becoming landowner 
and employer as well as administrator. In a small country like Zimbabwe, the 
effect of these settlers was enormous, and many Zimbabweans still argue that 
their entire way of life and culture were shaped by ‘Britain’.15 
 
Zimbabwe in the early years was not a classic gatekeeper state. As Cooper 
himself  points out, Zimbabwe began with a fairly well-diversified economy, 
thanks in part to the UDI years during which a more complex and diversified 
                                                        
13 In some ways the logics of the gatekeeper state looked similar to other parts of 
colonised Africa: connections with Britain were strong, and this was reflected in 
trade patterns throughout the first half of the 20th century (Mtisi, Nyakudya and 
Barnes, 2009a). The white farmers provided powerful sources of patronage and 
control through their monopoly over land, employment and the resources of the 
gate. But despite these ties, gatekeeping did not produce the narrowing effects 
seen in other parts of Africa. Many white farmers were deeply committed to their 
new country (Pilossof, 2012). Wealth was often not repatriated but reinvested 
into Rhodesia; the state was developed through the investment made by this 
increasingly wealthy class. As a result Rhodesia’s infrastructure – its roads, 
railway, banking system, post office – and the hold of legal-bureaucratic systems, 
took root in ways not seen in much of the rest of the continent.  
14 Ndlovu-Gatsheni, ‘Mapping cultural and colonial encounters’; Schmidt, 
Colonialism and violence in Zimbabwe. 
15 Gallagher, Zimbabwe’s International Relations. 
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economy was developed.16 The ZANU-PF government largely left economic 
control in the hands of white farmers and business. In those early years, 
Zimbabwe was more like a rational-bureaucratic state than many post-colonial 
African countries, with reasonably strong and widespread buy-in to existing 
state structures and procedures, and low levels of corruption. It had a relatively 
substantial formal sector, which was regularly taxed. Alongside a relatively 
strong manufacturing sector, Zimbabwe’s ‘gate’ was put to good use: agricultural 
exports were healthy, and aid flowed in. However, resources were used to extend 
state services for the black population, most notably in education and 
healthcare,17 rather than simply to service patronage networks in classic 
gatekeeping style. 
 
A heavier reliance on gatekeeping did begin to become more important as 
Zimbabwe’s economy declined, and in particular when the invasions of white 
farms began in 2000, led by a group of war veterans who were aggrieved about 
the slow pace of land reform. Although the government was taken off-guard, it 
quickly moved to support and add weight to a populist stand-off with the still 
rich and privileged white farmers, tying its stance into an increasingly bitter row 
it was waging against the British government which had refused to fund 
compensation for land redistribution in 1997.18 The effect of this was a double-
repudiation of Britain inside Zimbabwe: the violent expulsion of white farmers, 
the embodiment of Britain inside Zimbabwe, and the violent rejection of Western 
influence. Mamdani has controversially called this the moment of true 
Zimbabwean independence, comparing it to Idi Amin’s expulsion of Uganda’s 
Asian population.19 
 
                                                        
16 After the Universal Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1965 sanctions and 
international disapproval led to a burgeoning of Rhodesia’s manufacturing 
sector (Mtisi, Nyakudya and Barnes, 2009b). 
17 Muzondidya, ‘From Buoyancy to Crisis’; Herbst, State Politics in Zimbabwe. 
18  Tendi,  ‘The origins and functions of demonisation’  
19 Mamdani, ‘Lessons from Zimbabwe’. 
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In terms of gatekeeping, these shifts had profound implications. First, the 
removal of white farmers from the land, the resulting exodus of large numbers of 
them and the emasculation of those that remained, had the effect of solidifying 
and narrowing the gate in popular imagination. Now the gate more clearly 
separated Zimbabwe from Britain and the wider world: it sat on Zimbabwe’s 
borders rather than ambiguously diffused throughout its territory in the 
presence of white ‘British’ farmers. This idea was heavily reinforced by Mugabe’s 
vitriolic standoff with the British government, in which he depicted British 
ministers as vindictive and subversive agents in the destruction of Zimbabwean 
freedom and engaged in an attempt to re-colonise the country.20 He was able to 
tie Western support for the increasingly popular MDC into this narrative. As 
Ndlovu-Gatsheni has pointed out, Mugabe’s rhetoric described and then 
externalised divisions within Zimbabwe, projecting internal dichotomies by 
creating an ‘us’ and ‘them’ that sat either side of Zimbabwe’s borders instead of 
within them.21 
 
Second, this movement enabled the government to strengthen its material grip 
on the gate. The narrowed economy that was created and the redistribution of 
land to government supporters reinforced narrow patron-client networks and 
concentrated power. Ideologically, too, the government cut affective ties to 
Britain as a way to draw on the real grievances of colonial racism to shore up 
political support within an increasingly competitive political environment. Anti-
Western rhetoric was effective during election campaigns.22 
 
Third, and contrary to points one and two, the alienation of Britain and the West 
more broadly created potential problems for well-run gatekeeping. Sanctions 
from the EU and the US meant that aid was diverted away from the state 
(although aid continued directly to NGOs), while declining confidence caused 
                                                        
20 Tendi,  ‘The origins and functions of demonisation’ 
21 Ndlovu-Gatsheni ‘Making sense of Mugabeism’. 
22  Tendi, Making History in Mugabe’s Zimbabwe; Chan and Gallagher, Why 
Mugabe Won. 
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investment and tourism to shrivel up. Mugabe was going substantially against 
the grain by repudiating Western support, apparently eschewing the logics of 
extraversion.23 Instead of at least paying lip-service to the reforms usually 
demanded by Western donors in return for financial support, as Bayart argues 
the majority of African political leaders have done, Mugabe decided to explicitly 
refuse them. He began to use his rejection of Western political and economic 
ideas as a way to prove his anti-colonial credentials, rather than treating the 
West as a source of rents. This was a risk. A Zimbabwe cut off from parts of the 
world that had, since independence, formed an important source of support for 
its political and economic wellbeing did not seem viable, and indeed, as I outline 
later, this was of great concern to many ordinary Zimbabweans. However, 
Mugabe moved to secure the support of new patrons in the form of the Chinese 
government and private investors, particularly after the rise in gold prices and 
the discovery of diamonds in the east of the country in Marange. These ensured 
the survival of a more narrowly-shaped, classic gatekeeper state, now with a 
non-European international partner. 
 
A series of contingencies thus provides the underpinning to Zimbabwe’s 
consolidation as a gatekeeper state. Land invasions, the vitriolic arguments with 
the British government, the arrival of the Chinese and the exploitation of mineral 
resources did not form part of an overarching strategy, but they were well-
handled by an astute Zimbabwean government.  
 
However, this consolidation has not been driven just by elites. Gradually many 
Zimbabweans have come to adapt themselves to its logics. In the rest of the 
article I trace how this has come about through three steps. The first concerns 
the ways that citizens view state viability in terms of international relationships. 
This stems from the perception of the importance of the relationship with Britain 
as the former colonial power, and as such was connected to how Zimbabweans 
understand themselves and their state as ‘British’ in character. However, 
gradually this view shifted to a more general principle through two further steps: 
                                                        
23  Bayart, ‘Africa in the World’. 
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the widespread realisation of the practical importance of the gate for individuals 
who were driven to directly seek support beyond the gate; and a final acceptance 
of the state's monopoly on the gate. I trace these steps over the next three 
sections. 
 
 
Popular views on ZANU-PF’s unpopular gatekeeping  
 
In discussing their government’s performance, the Zimbabweans I interviewed 
made clear connections between international relationships, economic 
performance and state-viability. Government critics and government supporters 
expressed similar views in slightly different ways: bad relations with Britain and 
the West undermine wider Zimbabwean well-being. The difference concerned 
whether it was Mugabe or the British who were to blame for the breakdown. 
However the espousal of the Chinese as a replacement was generally suspect. 
Government critics in particular felt that Chinese patronage would work purely 
for the benefit of the elites, but supporters also expressed unease about their 
government’s ’strange’ new partner.  
 
In reappropriating land and repudiating British neo-colonial aspirations, Mugabe 
cut loose from the old colonial power and expelled its local embodiment, the 
white famer. The gate was closed to Britain. This was both empowering and 
troubling. It was empowering in the Mamdani sense, because it represented a 
confident national assertiveness, a moment of ‘real’ independence. But it was 
troubling because many Zimbabweans felt that it denied them the external 
material and moral support that were essential for wellbeing on practical and 
emotional levels. 
 
Many Zimbabweans who oppose the ruling ZANU-PF party feel a strong 
attachment to an idealised Britain, particularly in light of their bad experiences 
at the hands of the post-colonial state.24 What is perhaps more surprising is the 
                                                        
24  Gallagher, ‘Good state/bad state’. 
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way in which even ZANU-PF supporters raise concerns about spoiling the link 
between their country and the former colonial power. People talk in terms of the 
‘umbilical cord’ between the countries, of Britain as ‘part of our culture’, and the 
fact that ‘most of the infrastructure and the fibre of our economy is from that 
country’.25 Those opposed to the regime can argue that the British are, ‘very 
good to the people of Zimbabwe… [wanting] to make Zimbabwe good as before’ , 
and ‘God-fearing people, sympathetic to other people’s predicaments and 
wanting to help those in need’.26 There is a sense of fear that Mugabe, in 
repudiating the British, is spitefully cutting off their access to a more 
sympathetic source of support. But Mugabe supporters can become angry at the 
ways in which Britain has ‘abandoned’ them, tried to ‘kill the child coming from 
the womb’.27 One residents’ association chairman told me: ‘if the colonial power 
moves out and there are sanctions, factories close down and people lose jobs – 
families close down…These are the problems, because of the closure of 
companies. Something has been removed.’28 This man would not have criticised 
Mugabe for this withdrawal; but his comment highlights the importance he 
attaches to the relationship for Zimbabwe’s economic health, a view common 
among government supporters and critics alike. 
 
Mugabe’s stance was seen by many as bad gatekeeping – a failure to use the gate 
effectively to generate support – because of the deep anxiety that Zimbabweans 
remain materially dependent on Britain.  One trade union activist told me: ‘We 
cannot divorce ourselves from the rest of the world. We do not have the 
expertise to process our diamonds, to mine our gold. Tourism is vital – we want 
tourists. What good will it do if Zimbabwe is in isolation?’29  
 
                                                        
25 Chitungwiza resident, 28 Aug 2011; trade union members, 1 Sept 2011; 
Bulawayo resident, 28 May 2012 
26 Mbare resident, 2 Sept 2011; Chitungwiza resident, 4 Sept 2011 
27 ZANU-PF supporter, Bulawayo, 30 May 2012 
28 Civil Society activist, Bulawayo, 30 May 2012. 
29 Trade union activist, Harare, 31 Aug 2011 
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Others framed the argument in terms of Mugabe being naughty or childish. His 
irrational anger was preventing access to help to get out of the problems he had 
created, to spoil an important relationship. Two non-politically active people, 
one from Chitungwiza near Harare and the other from Old Pumula near 
Bulawayo made the point in a similar way:  
 
The president speaks badly about the British. He’s wrong. Just imagine, he 
speaks badly about the person who can help us out of our problems. I am 
embarrassed.30  
 
The president is always blaspheming and criticising the distant countries. 
He is doing something wrong. These people can also help you but he 
doesn’t consider that. He thinks he can do it all for himself. He will 
never.31  
 
The important thread that runs through this anxiety is the idea of shutting the 
gate altogether, leaving Zimbabwe without international partners and sources of 
support. Mugabe’s patriotic nationalism was an assertion that Zimbabwe didn’t 
need this anymore: but Zimbabweans were not so sure, seeing external support 
as economically essential. The widespread scepticism I found, particularly in 
urban areas, reflects low trust in the government following  electoral violence, 
the bulldozing of illegal homes in poor urban areas in Operation Murambatsvina, 
and the dire economic conditions produced by hyper-inflation.32 In this situation, 
many felt that the government had wilfully closed the gate to prevent Britain and 
other Western countries from helping them. Mugabe was the problem: he was 
blocking the gate. Another Chitungwiza resident summed up this idea: ‘Britain 
would like to help Zimbabwe, but there is one element that stops them, it is only 
                                                        
30 Chitungwiza resident, 28 Aug 2011 
31 Old Pumula resident, 30 May 2012 
32  Sachikonye, When a State turns on its citizens. 
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Mugabe… I know you are by the door, but you cannot come in because of that 
one element.’33 
 
When the government reached out to China as an alternative source of external 
resources, there was almost universal scorn. I found this amongst Mugabe’s 
supporters and critics, rural and urban alike, who used virtually identical terms 
to criticise the Chinese. As one Bulawayo-based civil society leader said: 
 
The Chinese? We are fed up of them. They are hated by the people here 
because they are Mugabe’s allies and they are looting gold and destroying 
the environment. They have been given mines so people view them with 
suspicion… They don’t care about the politics and governance unlike the 
UK and US that would put democracy as a condition of aid and this is why 
they are popular with African dictators. People … are suspicious too. They 
don’t trust the quality. ‘Best before 24 hours.’ They bring cheap things and 
then they exploit pure gold in exchange for cheap, poor quality things.34  
 
The Chinese are criticised because they don’t invest in people, but are ‘just 
looting’ mineral resources. They use the country as a dumping place for cheap 
goods reducing Zimbabweans to ‘consumers only’35  
 
This account is one of a narrower gatekeeper relationship. The government’s 
new international partners appear alien and disconnected from ordinary 
Zimbabweans. The benefits accrued focus more narrowly on state elites – the 
government ministers and senior military officials who have shares in the 
mining and luxury tourism concerns that the Chinese are engaging in – and on 
the Chinese themselves who dump sub-standard goods and remove profit 
without putting long-term investment into training, employment and the 
                                                        
33 Chitungwiza resident 4 September 2011 
34 Civil society activist, Bulawayo, 12 May, 2012 
35 Trade union activist, Bulawayo, 28 May 2012; Old Pumula resident, 30 May 
2012; Trade union representative, Harare, 5 Sept 2011 
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wellbeing of ordinary Zimbabweans. As one MDC activist put it: ‘China is another 
friend of the government. If a country is friends with the government they 
cannot be friends with the people of Zimbabwe.’36 
 
Zimbabweans from across the political spectrum are strongly convinced of the 
importance of the outside world, and view the state’s use of the gate as central to 
their wellbeing. For many, this is more than just a material wellbeing, as it is tied 
up with their identity – one commonly-made point is that Mugabe too suffers 
through his repudiation of Britain, that he ‘yearns for a relationship with Britain 
that is free of animosity and pettiness’, and ‘believes the British can actually 
come and repair him, can give him new political life’.37 Much of the criticism of 
the government’s gatekeeping is therefore not that the gate is unimportant, but 
that it is being misused. Wider and deeper interests and identity are excluded, 
and the divisions between state and society are deepened through the skewing 
of the distribution of spoils. 
 
 
 
The personalised gate 
 
As Zimbabwe has become more difficult to live in, with unemployment high and 
food scarce, people have come to rely directly on other countries for goods and 
services or for work. Hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans have left the 
country, many moving within the region to South Africa, Botswana and 
Mozambique; others to Europe and the US.38 From abroad, these migrants help 
keep family going back at home: ‘Everyone is relying on money sent from 
relatives in England.’39 Those that remain travel frequently: ‘Botswana and South 
Africa… have become our lifeline – people go there to trade and bring food 
                                                        
36 Chitungwiza resident, 28 Aug 2011 
37 Civil society activist, Harare, 30 August 2011 
38 Crush and Tevera, Zimbabwe’s Exodus, p3) 
39 Trade union activist, Harare, 31 August 2011 
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back.’40 And others find safety abroad during times of political violence. I 
interviewed many MDC activists who left for South Africa during the post-
election violence in 2005 and 2008, sitting it out there until the situation calmed 
down. 
 
Thus the outside world became in the 2000s more heavily and directly essential 
for private family or individual survival. The state, which many still believe 
should provide for them, was preoccupied. As one respondent put it: ‘The 
president is like a father, but this one has kicked all his children out.’41 In 
particular, the young are leaving, causing concern among the old left behind. A 
group of religious leaders from Matabeleland, a region historically neglected by 
the state, described this problem: ‘People don’t think there is any solution for 
them yet, in the medium-term. In this region most people are no longer staying 
in this country. The young people want to go out – they have surrendered.’42 
Many disappear. The suspicion is that they have failed to make good. Others are 
able to help support their families, like this trade union organiser who hadn’t 
received her salary for more than two years: ‘I’ve got a sister in the Netherlands 
and two daughters in Cape Town: that’s how I keep going… I’m like a useless 
mother to my own children.’43 
 
Part of the stress people describe stems from the perception of a deficit created 
at the gate by the crisis situation. Zimbabwe no longer pulls resources in through 
its gate as much as it loses them – in qualified people whose efforts abroad lead 
to a trickle of resources back. The country is hollowed-out, supported by 
exported, external scaffolding. Moreover, the scaffolding is an individualised 
support system, reaching into the country to hold up families and homes. It 
                                                        
40 Chitungwiza resident, 28 August 2011 
41 Chitungwiza resident, 28 August 2011 
42 Religious leaders, Bulawayo, 29 May 2012 
43 Trade union organiser, Bulawayo, 28 May 2012 
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further fragments a brittle society. This point was made by a civil society 
organiser in Bulawayo, Matabeleland’s capital:44  
 
When Matabeleland failed to develop, a lot of people felt unappreciated 
here. You had fatherless children who had no birth certificate so they 
could not participate in national life. So instead of going into form one, 
people went to South Africa where they were welcome. From every home 
you had at least one person going to South Africa… In Matabeleland’s 
rural areas, the roads are so bad, schools are so far apart, cleaning so 
neglected. Everything that has to be attended to by the government is so 
bad. Only our private homes are strong.45  
 
For individuals there is therefore a sense of dependence on the outside world 
that they must organise for themselves because the government is not pursuing 
it effectively in the national interest. Most Zimbabweans are necessarily focused 
on the world beyond Zimbabwe and what comes from it, and this means 
attention is focused on the gate. But the only way to make this work is to engage 
in a constant negotiation and battle with the state’s gatekeepers. Smuggling and 
evasion become important skills as Zimbabweans attempt to avoid state control 
of the gate. A group of informal workers who between them travel regularly to 
South Africa, Zambia, Dubai, Britain, Tanzania and Japan, described the 
difficulties they faced. 
 
                                                        
44 The region as a whole has experienced state neglect more deeply and for much 
longer than the rest of the country. Many of those interviewed pointed out that it 
has only been in recent years that those living in other parts of the country have 
begun to experience similar problems. They argue that their experiences, deeper 
and of longer duration, are now coming to be felt throughout the rest of 
Zimbabwe. 
45 Civil society organiser, Bulawayo, 28 May 2012 
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Zimbabweans are very, very enterprising. We get [capital] from friends 
and family. Then we pay back and get some money to go back again. We 
can’t get access to cash at the bank. 
 
I’ve been going to South Africa to buy blankets, DVDs and televisions but 
it’s becoming increasingly difficult. Duty has increased. 
 
Most people join together, like four or five people going to Japan, but only 
one will go. Some cooperate, one goes and comes back, with shoes, 
clothing, food, maybe furniture. 
 
The major problem is how to get goods into Zimbabwe. The police will 
come and get everything because I don’t have permission to sell. 
 
Along with the Zimra Control [the tax authority] who can take all your 
property. 
 
Every effort is being stifled. You try to go out, you try to buy and sell here. 
It’s stifling. But [you] can’t sit back at home.46 
 
The restrictions imposed at the gate are seen as an attempt by the state to 
prevent survival. Sitting at home doing nothing has meant potential starvation – 
particularly in 2008 when hyper-inflation had destroyed the value of the 
currency and left the shops empty. And so this becomes a struggle between 
enterprising individuals trying to keep their families alive and a predatory state 
that seeks to restrict, confiscate and deprive. The gate has thus been a means 
through which many people find safety and resources, and also the way in which 
family members have been lost. The dramatic exodus through the gate in recent 
years has further hollowed out Zimbabwe, leaving its interior depleted and 
fragile, supported by some of its most vigorous members’ activities beyond it. In 
these circumstances, the gate becomes a vital means of private support. 
                                                        
46 Informal workers focus group, Harare, 6 Sept 2011 
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The state in these circumstances appears at best an irrelevance, and at worst an 
impediment to people’s wellbeing. Rather than provide the ‘multiple roots’ and 
‘alternative models for changes’ as Cooper suggests of the creative and diverse 
international relationships created by Africans at every level,47 they reinforce the 
sense of a chasm between the state and people, each using its international 
connections for survival and self-enrichment.  
 
 
The state wins monopoly of the gate  
 
The period of 2008-2013, the years of the GNU, were critical for the 
consolidation of Zimbabwe as a gatekeeper state. Referred to as a ‘transitional 
period’48 it brought a measure of stability after several years of crisis, yet felt to 
many like a time of suspension. Although at the time it appeared that a full 
transition to democracy under a new constitution and a victory for the MDC was 
possible, the 2013 elections confirmed the hegemony of ZANU-PF and the logics 
of a narrowed gatekeeper state.49  This period further solidified the gatekeeper 
state through the growth of popular acceptance of state control over it. This was 
realised over the GNU period as people were increasingly tied into state 
patronage networks, through both coercion and the promise of opportunities. 
 
There are two parts to this. The first concerns the ways in which Mugabe 
managed to win people over to his depiction of the West as the enemy of 
                                                        
47 Cooper, Africa since 1940, p185) 
48 Masunungure and Shumba, Zimbabwe 
49 Despite the rigging and manipulation practised in 2013 by ZANU-PF, much of 
the analysis views this as not decisive, pointing rather to important shifts in the 
political affiliations and priorities of Zimbabweans over the GNU period. See 
work by Booysen (2014); Dube & Makaya (2013); Gallagher (2015b); LeBas 
(2014); Ncube (2013); Raftopoulos (2013); Southall (2013); Tendi (2013); 
Zamchiya (2013) and Chan & Gallagher (2017). 
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Zimbabwe. This created (and perhaps echoed) a growing detachment of 
Zimbabweans from their faith in Britain, both in terms of the ideology of a 
rational-bureaucratic state that it represented and which many had once aspired 
to; and as a sympathetic and potential saviour. Loosening these connections left 
Mugabe much more firmly in charge of the agenda for how to make international 
relationships work for Zimbabwe. The second was the widespread 
disappointment in the MDC’s record in office, which undermined faith in their 
‘alternative’ approach to managing the state. 
  
The juxtaposition of the West against Zimbabwe was articulated during the 2013 
election campaign – as it had been in earlier ones. Mugabe in particular managed 
to make Western sanctions an important issue during the campaign, pointing to 
them as the main cause of economic decline. This issue became very effective: 
even MDC-loyalists who had supported their party’s encouragement of 
sanctions, began to waiver. This debate is reflected in a discussion between MDC 
activists in Bulawayo, three months after the election: 
 
We might think sanctions are not affecting the country [but] ZANU-PF is 
talking about sanctions every day. If companies close they say it’s 
sanctions… In the opposition, they have been supporting sanctions but 
they are not going to win the election if they support sanctions. People 
believe that now. But we are just defending the sanctions. 
 
The effects of sanctions are debatable, but people end up believing it. The 
media says it, Mugabe says it, even some African countries are saying it. 
It’s a mobilizing tool for ZANU-PF in Zimbabwe and to other African allies. 
 
The only effect of sanctions has been to draw Mugabe closer to his 
people.50 
 
                                                        
50 MDC activists, Bulawayo, 9 November 2013  
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The MDC’s loss of popular resonance during the GNU is critical here. In the run-
up to 2008 the party achieved substantial support by offering a clear-cut 
alternative to a discredited ZANU-PF. The MDC-Tsvangirai had established itself 
as the antithesis of ZANU-PF, a representation of an ideal Western-style regime 
during a period when politics was highly polarised.51 However, the period of 
power-sharing badly eroded both the perception of difference between the 
parties,52 and the credibility of the MDC’s alternative politics.53 Corruption 
among MDC MPs, perceptions of arrogance, Tsvangirai’s colourful love-life, all 
eroded confidence in the party.  
 
The party’s association with white farmers (many of whom had supported it 
from the start) and reluctance to condemn Western sanctions became liabilities. 
One MDC activist described the change: ‘It was good in the old days to associate 
with white men. Mugabe has made it difficult, made people understand that to be 
a black man is important. If we come to the people and speak in English, they tell 
us off.’54 
 
According to political activists and voters, the reasons for this can be traced to 
the perception that the MDC’s programme didn’t offer anything very tangible. 
The experiences of the MDC in government showed that human rights and 
democracy were ephemeral luxuries. Particularly problematic was the feeling 
that the MDC did not have the inclination or capacity to fulfil people’s material 
needs. An important feature of its attraction for voters was its Western 
connections – as one rural voter put it, ‘people thought investors would come 
into the country’55 – but the Western backers had not come through. Speaking of 
the MDC’s failure to exploit Western patronage, one Bulawayo voter said: ‘The 
                                                        
51 LeBas, From Protest to Parties. 
52 LeBas, ‘The perils of power-sharing’. 
53 Gallagher, ‘The battle for Zimbabwe’. 
54 MDC activist Bulawayo, 9 November 2013 
55 Head teacher, Mashonaland Central, 14 November 2013 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Third World Thematics. 
Published version available from: https://doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2018.1446762   
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26243/  
 
23 
 
MDC said they had keys, but they didn't get anything.’56 Neither had they made 
good use of their time in government. A rural voter in Matabeleland South said: 
‘These MDC guys went to government and came out poor.’57  
 
During this period, and particularly in the run-up to polling in 2013, ZANU-PF 
worked hard to ensure that resources were distributed throughout the country. 
Particularly in areas which the party had once written off (most notably the 
Ndebele-dominated Matabeleland), huge attempts were made to woo voters 
with presents and promises, backed up substantially by the party’s policies of 
continued land redistribution and share ownership. Gift-giving was highlighted 
as important in poor rural areas. An NGO worker explained its effect: 
‘Considering the campaigns that they were holding, it was obvious that they 
would win. If you come and promise or donate things immediately before the 
election, these people will support.’58 
 
It was particularly persuasive in Matabeleland, as a group of MDC activists 
reported: 
 
During election time it was a free-for-all. Politicians gave out rice and 
promised [people] areas to build their houses. The appeal of ZANU-PF 
was direct and immediate.  
 
I asked a man why did you vote for ZANU-PF? He [told me that] they 
brought food, community share ownership – this for them is 
development. The MDC talks devolution. 59 
 
                                                        
56 ZANU-PF activist 11 November 2013 
57 Rural residents, Motobo, Matabeleland South, 10 November 2013 
58 NGO employee, Mashonaland Central, 14 November 2013 
59 MDC activists, Bulawayo, 9 November 2013  
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An important shift had taken place – even in Matabeleland which has been 
staunchly anti-ZANU-PF since the Gukurahundi massacres in the 1980s.60 The 
parties were now being judged on their capacity to deliver resources, and there 
was an expectation that they would use foreign patronage or access to state 
resources in order to do this. By the time of the 2013 election campaign, ZANU-
PF’s distribution of resources – actual and promised – were seen as a sign that 
they were prepared to do this, while the MDC was not. 
 
Briain Raftopoulos has argued that ZANU-PF has entrenched itself by developing 
a complex and effective set of patronage networks that provide coercive impetus 
as well as the prospect of access to wealth, and these are now widely spread.61 
These networks operate powerfully throughout the informal and mining sectors. 
For the poorest, the only way to secure a trading stand, or access a mining job is 
through local ZANU-PF patronage, making alternative affiliation unviable. Land 
redistribution has tied large numbers of small farmers into these networks, 
which are administered through local headmen loyal to the ruling party, and the 
new share ownership scheme appears to offer further opportunities for those 
who join the ZANU-PF movement. 
 
The head of a development agency who works with new small-scale farmers 
explained the effects this has had in the rural areas: ‘From the small farmer’s 
perspective, there has been an improvement. If you look at the assets people 
have been able to acquire… I know friends who owned six, seven, eight tonne 
trucks. They would go and collect crops to take to market, but they are no longer 
                                                        
60 One suggestion as to why this dramatic shift was so evident in Matabeleland 
was the idea held by many voters that the MDC – which represented the region 
and was now in government – was ‘in power’ during the GNU and thus 
responsible for the continuing problems of the country. In ZANU-PF strongholds, 
such as Mashonaland Central, there was a stronger tendency to see the MDC as 
still in opposition (Gallagher, 2017). 
61 Raftopoulos, ‘The 2013 elections in Zimbabwe’. 
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profitable. A lot of farmers have bought their own small trucks so they can take 
their own and their neighbours’ crops.’62 
 
The patronage networks extended into the urban middle- and aspiring- classes, 
many of which had formerly been staunch supporters of the MDC. With the 
erosion of the formal sector, and the growth of opportunities for business 
interests that aligned themselves with ZANU-PF, many middle-class voters have 
been able to profit effectively from the shifting regime. A businessman told me:  
 
The problem for the MDC is that the middle class grew very well under 
the GNU. My brother did very well – he bought two houses… He used to be 
a strong MDC man. Now he is ZANU-PF. He sees many opportunities from 
the indiginisation programme and being part of ZANU-PF… My brother 
would like to farm. All the big guys have farms. Mugabe's rhetoric on land 
and race really resonated with Zimbabweans. It means a lot to them… For 
guys like my brother, the MDC doesn't seem to offer very much.63  
 
Gatekeeping makes sense as long as the spoils are widely distributed, and many 
people felt they were, at least in the 2013 election year. Even as widely suspect 
an international partner as China was acceptable under these terms. I found 
notably less concern about the Chinese relationship in 2013. The MDC’s failure in 
government was interpreted less as being about the compromises it made in 
power, than about the realisation that it didn’t understand this logic of how to 
use the gate properly. Reflective members of civil society – and many MDC-
supporters – realised that their political, social and economic system had 
undergone an important change. As one civil society leader put it: ‘The patronage 
                                                        
62 Head of a Development Agency, Mashonaland Central, 14 November 2013 
63 Harare-based businessman, interviewed in Bulawayo, 9 November 2013 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Taylor & Francis in Third World Thematics. 
Published version available from: https://doi.org/10.1080/23802014.2018.1446762   
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: https://eprints.soas.ac.uk/26243/  
 
26 
 
approach really worked for ZANU-PF to give them numbers.’64 Another said: ‘The 
real story is about how ZANU-PF met the needs of people.’65  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
This article has described the consolidation of Zimbabwe as a gatekeeper state. It 
has done so by looking at the ways in which the country’s external relationships, 
and the dramatic ways these have changed in recent years, have been 
understood and to an extent produced by its citizens.  
 
Zimbabwe’s gate has been consolidated through a narrowing and concentration 
of its focus, enabling a tighter state control; but also through its broadening 
appeal. For elites, it is an effective way for them to entrench themselves – as 
Cooper suggests. But it makes sense to ordinary people too. Zimbabweans have 
become increasingly pragmatic about the endurance of their political elites. 
Gatekeeping makes sense as a way to harvest resources from the outside world. 
Many have come to see this on a personal level, and now also view their own 
government operation within the same logic. They are less romantic about the 
need for an affective relationship with the wider world, marking the worth of 
international relationships in more quantifiable ways and less optimistic about 
more diffused engagement with the wider world through the gate, or the 
alternatives offered by legal-bureaucratic systems. 
 
As an idea, the gate is extremely powerful. It pulls Zimbabwean elites and 
population together, pitting them against the wider world, now more clearly 
separated. The gate marks the separation, and encapsulates the character of the 
relationship between the inside and the outside.  
 
                                                        
64 Civil society activist, Bulawayo, 11 November 2013 
65 Bulawayo-based civil society activist, interviewed in Harare, 13 November 
2013 
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The Zimbabwe case study highlights tells us some new things about the 
gatekeeper state. One is about its evolution, which here is more complex and 
contingent than Cooper appears to allow for, and the other is about the role it 
plays in cementing or eroding state-society relations. Both of these speak to the 
issue of legitimacy, and highlight Cooper’s neglect of the importance of the 
colonial legacy as ideational or emotional as well as institutional or material. My 
argument is not that the external world has become more important to 
Zimbabwe, but that the idea of how this works has become much more narrowly 
focused. Ordinary Zimbabweans who would have seen their relationship with 
the West as complex, involving an emotional attachment, tied up with their sense 
of identity, and far less dichotomised between the outside and the inside, have 
increasingly come to adopt the concept of the gate as narrower, concentrated 
more clearly in the hands of the state, confined largely to material benefits, and 
tied more firmly into a narrower conception of how the resources generated are 
distributed. If the gatekeeper state was less of a reality for Zimbabweans at 
independence, it has become one since, and, I would argue, this has occurred 
because it makes sense to both elites and the wider population.  
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